We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game with a deadline. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the deadline is kept fixed. This limit is close to the discrete Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the deadline goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution. Regarding this limit as a bargaining solution under deadline, we provide an axiomatic characterization.
Introduction
We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game with a deadline. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the deadline is kept fixed. This limit is close to the discrete Raiffa solution (Raiffa 1951 (Raiffa , 1953 (Raiffa , 2002 when the time horizon is very short. If the deadline goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution (Chae 1993; Nash 1950 Nash , 1953 .
Our interest in finite horizon bargaining problems stems from the observation that many real situations involve fixed deadline. As an example, consider merger negotiations between two firms before special tax benefits for merger expires. Bargaining models with a fixed time horizon are widely used in economic application like incomplete contract theory and search theory. It is also of theoretical interest to study the relation between the Nash bargaining solution and the equilibrium outcome of strategic bargaining models with very little discounting.
In this paper we study first the limit of equilibrium outcomes (as the discount factor goes to one) of a sequential bargaining game under a fixed horizon. After that we explore a class of solutions for dynamic bargaining situations from an axiomatic viewpoint. To do that we have to include in definition of a bargaining problem also parameters corresponding to time horizon and discount factor. To our knowledge, not much effort has been devoted to include the time dimension in the axiomatic bargaining theory (one exception being the recent paper by Diskin et al. (2009) discussed below).
The sequential bargaining game we analyze is a standard random proposer model, and there is an important precedence of this study by Gomes et al. (1999) (referred to as GHM below). In order to investigate the NTU-value of a characteristic function game, they set up a sequential bargaining game (with a probability of breakdown instead of a discount factor), and look at the limit of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the number of period tends to infinity and the breakdown probability vanishes. They find that depending upon the way these two parameters converge, limit outcome could be the Raiffa solution or the Nash solution, and there are borderline cases where the limit outcome lies between these two solutions. The solution studied in our paper corresponds to these borderline cases.
To characterize the limit outcome as the length of a period vanishes, we utilize a differential equation obtained by taking the limit process of the continuation values. There are several precursors to this approach. We make use of the proof by Coles and Wright (1998) who study infinite horizon problem with time dependent agreement sets. GHM also use a similar dynamic process to characterize their solution, and they show that the process is related to backwards induction principle. [GHM attribute this method to Maschler et al. (1988) ].
It is well known that with discounting, as the deadline tends to infinity, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the random offer or alternating offer bargaining game converges to the equilibrium outcome of the corresponding infinite horizon game (Binmore 1987) . Moreover this outcome converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the discount factor goes to one. All these results are established in Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore (1987) . When the deadline is kept fixed, the results change.
Following Stahl (1972) , Sjostrom (1991) analyzed a game related to the Rubinstein (1982) model. A finite time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length. Sjostrom (1991) proved that without discounting, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes converge to the discrete Raiffa solution as the number of bargaining periods increases without limit. He showed also that with very little discounting the limit outcome lies very close to the Raiffa solution. Of course with constant non-negligible discounting this result does not restrict the outcome much and in fact as the deadline goes to infinity, the outcome converges to the Nash solution.
